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Just after the 1994 Term ended, a book on the Rehnquist Court
appeared entitled The Center Holds.1 A commentator stated, "the ti-
tle is just one letter off. 'It should be, The Center Folds."' 2
During the 1994 Term, did the Court center hold or did it fold?
The center did both - depending upon the particular case decided.
My analysis will focus upon two of the most important decisions dur-
ing the Term: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,3 in which the center
definitely held, and United States v. Lopez,4 where the key votes of the
center Justices resulted in a crucial decision limiting federal power.
II. TERM LIMrrs AND FEDERALISM
In the Term Limits case, a bare majority ruled that the Arkansas
limit on the terms of members of Congress was unconstitutional.
5
Most striking to a Court student was the fact that all the opinions in
the case focused upon core issues concerning the federal system, some
of which had been debated at the time of the framing and some which
were entirely new. The opinions were, in large part, excursions into
the history of the Constitution and the intent of the Framers, as well
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner's Guide to the October 1994
Supreme Court Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, November 17, 1995.
t Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. JANMEs F. SIMON, Tim CENTER HoLDs: THE POWER STRUGGLE INsIDE TH= REHNQUIST
COURT (1995).
2. Tony Mauro, Tug of War In the 1994-1995 Term; Can the Center Hold?, LEGAL TIMEs,
July 31, 1995, at A23.
3. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
4. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
5, Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1847.
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as the experience over the two centuries during which the Constitu-
tion has been in existence. In fact, the authority most frequently cited
in the Term Limits opinions was The Federalist,6 which was, of course,
written just before the Constitution was adopted, and the second most
frequently cited was Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States,7 published in 1833.8 Term Limits was a case in
which the Court really went to the basic sources.
Term Limits could have been decided relatively easily under the
Qualifications Clauses of Article I,9 which provide specifically that to
be a United States Senator or Representative, the individual must be
of a certain age, a citizen of the United States, and an inhabitant of
the state from which that person is chosen. It would have been simple
for the Court to rule, as it did in Powell v. McCormack'° with regard
to congressional imposition of additional qualifications, that the listing
of the three specific qualifications indicated a clear intent on the part
of the Framers that those were to be the only qualifications. 11 Instead,
both the majority and the dissent discussed in great detail their own
approaches to federalism, and more particularly the operation of the
Tenth Amendment.
The majority opinion of Justice Stevens laid down a new Tenth
Amendment rule: the powers reserved to the states can only include
those powers which the states possessed at the time the Constitution
was ratified. 2 Under this rule, the states may not exercise a power
under the Tenth Amendment which they had not exercised before rat-
ification of the Constitution.' 3
Applying this principle to the Term Limits case, the Court ruled
that the states could not exercise any power related to operation of
the government under the Constitution unless the power was specifi-
cally delegated to them. 4 According to the Stevens opinion, the re-
served powers do not include state power to add qualifications for
congressional membership in addition to those stated in the Constitu-
tion. The power to add congressional qualifications is not within the
6. THE FEDERALIST (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
7. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (3d ed.
1858).
8. The FEDERALIST was cited some 44 times in the Lopez opinions, and Story's COMMEN.
TARIEs some 20 times.
9. U.S. CONsr. art. I, §§ 2, cl. 2 & 3, cl. 3.
10. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
11. Id. at 550.
12. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1854 (1995).
13. Id. at 1854-55.
14. Id. at 1854.
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states' pre-Tenth-Amendment "original powers;" it is a new right
arising from the Constitution itself, and is therefore not reserved.
Under Term Limits, the Constitution is the exclusive source of
qualifications for members of Congress, and it "divested" states of any
power to add qualifications. Nor is the prescription of congressional
term limits a permissible exercise of state power under the Elections
Clause, which allows states to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections."'16 That clause was intended to grant states au-
thority to protect the integrity and regularity of the election process
by regulating election procedures, not to provide them with license to
impose additional qualifications.
The dissent of Justice Thomas took an entirely different ap-
proach. It urged that Tenth-Amendment reserved powers are not re-
stricted to those the states possessed before the Constitution. 7
Instead, the states retain all authority not specifically denied to them.
Hence, they need not point to any affirmative grant of power in order
to prescribe qualifications for their representatives in Congress. It is
enough that power is not denied in the Constitution. 8
The Thomas approach to the reserved power issue is simple - if
not simplistic: In determining whether a power is one which the states
do in fact possess, only two questions have to be asked: (1) is it a
power which the Constitution delegates exclusively to the federal gov-
ernment; (2) is it a power which the Constitution denies to the states?
If the answer is "no" to both questions, the states possess the power.' 9
The New York Times likened the Thomas approach to an attempt
to reinstall the Articles of Confederation.2 ° One can only, with the
famous Cardozo comment, "find hyperbole in [this] sanguinary sim-
ile."2' It can in fact be argued that, in terms of strict federalism the-
ory, Justice Thomas is closer to the historical intent in the matter. On
the other hand, in terms of the need to meet today's "felt necessi-
ties,"'22 the majority decision may take a more realistic account of both
the way in which the national government has developed and the tre-
mendous powers which it has assumed. Even more important, the
Term Limits decision, in Justice Stevens' words "vindicates the ...
15. Id. at 1855.
16. U.S. CONsr. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.
17. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
18. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
19. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
20. Linda Greenhouse, Focus on Federal Power, N.Y. Trmms, May 24, 1995, at Al.
21. See Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 33 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
22. OLWER WENDELL HoLMEs, THm COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (32d ed. 1938).
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'fundamental principle of our representative democracy' ... , namely
that 'the people should choose whom they please to govern them,' ' 23
as well as the modem "egalitarian ideal - that election to the Na-
tional Legislature should be open to all people of merit. 21 4
It is, of course, a fact that, when the Constitution was adopted,
the United States was very far from a practicing democracy and that
the Framers knew this and intended to keep it that way. During the
ensuing two centuries, however, the great theme in our history has
been the spread of both the democratic principle and the notion of
equality. Both franchise and representation have been expanded
from the restrictive conception that prevailed at the beginning to the
point where virtually anyone who meets minimal qualifications of age,
citizenship, and residence is permitted to vote and seek office.
Justice Thomas appears to have the better of the historical argu-
ment. During the first part of our history, the states did impose addi-
tional qualifications upon both voters and those who were seeking to
run for public office.- 5 If we follow the Stevens reasoning, these quali-
fications were all unconstitutional.2 6 But Term Limits was deciding
how the Constitution should be read in 1995, not how it was read in
1789 - a matter to which we shall return at a later point.
III. THE LoPEZ CASE: A COMMERCE CLAUSE TURNING POINT?
In its impact upon federal power, the 1994 Term's great case was
United States v. Lopez.27 Its holding indicates that those who thought
that the federal commerce power was unbounded may have to recon-
sider that conclusion. Since the Court's 1937 "constitutional revolu-
tion,"'  when there were "sea changes in the Court's conceptions of
... [the] Commerce Clause,"" it has become a constitutional clich6
that the Commerce Clause has virtually no outer limits. This idea was
strikingly demonstrated in another 1995 commerce case.30 During the
23. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1862 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547
(1969)).
24. Id.
25. The most obvious, of course, was the sexual qualification that used to govern most
elections.
26. The same is true of current qualifications in some states such as those listed by Justice
Thomas. See Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1909 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (listing qualifications such
as mental incompetency, current imprisonment, and past vote fraud convictions).
27. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
28. See CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941).
29. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1653 (Souter, J., dissenting).
30. United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995).
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argument there, Justice O'Connor asked the assistant solicitor gen-
eral, "'Is there any business enterprise in America that wouldn't be
covered' by the Government's broad theory of the commerce power
*.."31 None, he answered, "'[i]n our economy in this day and age, I
can't think of anything that is likely to happen in the real world' that
would not be related to interstate commerce. "32
In Lopez, on the contrary, the Court declared specifically, "con-
gressional power under the Commerce Clause... is subject to outer
limits.''33 The Lopez decision was the first in over half a century to
rule that a federal statute went beyond those limits. At issue was a
law that made it a federal offense to possess a gun in or near a
school.34 A student carrying a concealed handgun in his school was
found guilty of violating this statute.35 The conviction was reversed on
the ground that the law was beyond the reach of the commerce
power.36
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion stated that there were three
broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under the
commerce power: (1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce;
(2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or things
in interstate commerce; and (3) those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce.37 Justice Rehnquist (as he then was)
had stated the requirement of substantial effect in a 1981 case,3" but he
then spoke only for himself. In Lopez, it was an opinion of the Court,
not one by Rehnquist alone, that stated the effect-on-commerce test
in terms that require a substantial effect on commerce.
If the Lopez statute was to be upheld, it must be under the third
category as a regulation of an activity that substantially affects inter-
state commerce. However, according to Lopez, a statute does not
come within this category unless the activity regulated is a commercial
31. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Step In as Federalism's Referee, N.Y. Trams, April 28, 1995,
at Al (quoting Justice O'Connor). See also Transcript of Oral Argument, 1995 WL 115550,
United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995) (No. 94-251) (reprinting the full text of the
Robertson oral argument).
32. Greenhouse, supra note 31, at Al (quoting Miguel Estrada, Assistant to the Solicitor
General, Department of Justice).
33. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628.
34. Id. at 1626.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1629-30.
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activity.39 The Lopez law "is a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise,
however broadly one might define those terms. '40 Lopez thus limits
Congressional power under the third category to "regulations of activ-
ities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transac-
tion."'" More than that, the activity must be one, "which viewed in
the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce." 42
It should be noted that Justice Breyer's dissent also accepted the
view that it is not enough that interstate commerce is affected in the
given case; Breyer also said that there has to be more than just some
effect upon commerce.43 To Justice Breyer, the Chief Justice went too
far: the activity does not have to substantially affect interstate com-
merce; it only has to significantly affect interstate commerce. 4 e We
can leave it to language purists to tell us the difference between sub-
stantially and significantly. But even the Lopez dissenters recognized
that the earlier cases had gone too far. It is not enough to have only a
very remote effect - what Chief Justice Stone once called an effect
through "a 'house that Jack built' chain of causation '45 or what Justice
Roberts termed "the old story of the pebble thrown into the pool, and
the theoretically infinite extent of the resulting waves, albeit too tiny
to be seen or felt by the exercise of one's senses. ' 46 All the Justices
recognized in Lopez that there has to be a real quantitative aspect
(substantial or significant) to the effect that the given activity has on
interstate commerce.
How did Chief Justice Rehnquist apply this approach in Lopez?
First, he decided, carrying a gun to school is not a commercial activity;
hence, there was no commerce involved in this case.47 The cases dur-
ing the past half century had indicated that, paradoxical though it may
seem, the commerce power is not limited to regulating economic ac-
tivity; thus, there could be Congressional regulation of activities that
do not involve commerce.48 Now Lopez has closed the door to that
view.
39. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
40. Id. at 1630-31.
41. Id. at 1631 (emphasis added).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
45. Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679, 685 (1945) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
46. Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 94 (1942) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
47. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
48. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533,549 (1944) (hold-
ing that "transactions [may] be commerce though non-commercial").
[Vol. 31:521
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Even more important, the Lopez majority concluded that carry-
ing a gun to school has no substantial impact on interstate commerce
at all.49 Justice Breyer tried to show that there was what he called a
significant effect, because guns in school have an adverse impact on
the educational process and that in turn has an adverse effect on the
nation's economy.50 The majority rejected this approach, saying that
under the Breyer "reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity
that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual
citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody),
for example."''5 Under the dissenters' theory,
it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in
areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States
historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the dis-
sent's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an
individual that Congress is without power to regulate.5 2
Of course, nobody wants to allow pupils to carry guns to schools.
But is this not the type of situation that should be dealt with by the
states? In fact, most states have a law making it a crime to have a gun
in school.5 3 In Lopez itself defendant was first charged under Texas
law.54 Why should the United States Attorney have stepped in?
Wasn't this a local crime which should have been prosecuted locally?
The same questions can be asked about two 1995 circuit court
cases in which defendants were convicted for burning down residential
dwellings.55 Here, too, it may be asked whether arson is not a local
crime that should be prosecuted locally. However, the defendants
were convicted under an act of Congress that makes it a federal crime
to destroy by fire "any building... used in interstate or foreign com-
merce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 5 6
The Government argued that the houses destroyed were "used in" or
"used in an activity affecting" commerce because they received elec-
tricity or natural gas, some of which came from out-of-state sources.5 7
49. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
50. Id. at 1659-60 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1632.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 1626.
55. United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ramey, 24
F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1994).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994).
57. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d at 525; Ramey, 24 F.3d at 607.
19961
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In a case decided the year before Lopez,58 the Fourth Circuit fol-
lowed what it termed the "nearly boundless" pre-Lopez law 9 and af-
firmed the conviction, stating "that connection of a house to an
interstate power grid constitutes a sufficient use in an activity that af-
fects commerce. ' 60 Three months later, the Ninth Circuit reached a
different result. That court stressed the Lopez requirement of "sub-
stantial" effect on commerce. "[A] house," it stated, "has a particu-
larly local rather than interstate character .... The arson of such a
structure has only a remote and indirect effect on interstate com-
merce." 61 Hence, Lopez required reversal of the arson conviction:
Lopez demonstrates that the receipt of natural gas at the... resi-
dence from out-of-state sources is insufficient as a matter of law to
confer federal jurisdiction .... The residence was not used at all for
commercial activity. It was purely private. If the Commerce Clause
were extended to reach the activity that the government seeks to
punish here, we would be "hard-pressed to posit any activity by an
individual that Congress is without power to regulate." 62
What was at issue here was "a simple state arson crime. It should
have been tried in state court. '63
The Ninth Circuit decision shows that Lopez may mark a new
turning point in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Whether it does
will depend on future applications of the limitations stated in the Lo-
pez opinion - in particular, what commercial activities will be found
not to substantially affect interstate commerce. At a minimum, Lopez
indicates that, despite the post-1937 jurisprudence, the commerce
power, though broad, does not include the authority to regulate each
and every aspect of local activities.
IV. A ToucH OF GILBERT AND SULLIVAN
Term Limits aside, the center did not hold in the most important
1994 Term cases. Indeed, according to the New York Times survey of
the term, "The center all but disappeared from the Court this term."6
58. Ramey, 24 F-3d at 602.
59. Id. at 606.
60. As explained in United States v. Moore, Nos. 93-5273, 93-5274, 92-5281, 1994 WL
251174, at *3 (4th Cir. June 10, 1994).
61. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d at 527-28.
62. Id. at 527 (quoting in part United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995)).
63. Id. at 528.
64. Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: Gravel Rousers, Farewell to the Old Order in the Court,
N.Y. Tmi s, July 2, 1995, § 4.
[Vol. 31:521
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The headline for this article was "Farewell to the Old Order in the
Court."65
It is, however, too soon to conclude that the Chief Justice has
finally triumphed in his continuing effort to remake constitutional ju-
risprudence in his own image. True, he is closer to that goal than at
any time since his original appointment. On the Burger Court, Justice
Rehnquist stood virtually alone on the extreme right. It was then that
he received a Lone Ranger doll as a gift from his law clerks, who
called him the "lone dissenter" during that period.66 During his four-
teen years as an Associate Justice, Rehnquist dissented alone fifty-
four times - a Court record.67
After he became Chief Justice, Rehnquist received reinforcement
from Justices Scalia and Thomas; the three become a majority when
they are joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. It was their votes
that enabled the Chief Justice's view to prevail in most of the Term's
important cases. But the majority is a fragile one and a shift by either
or both of the "swing" Justices leaves Rehnquist and his more faithful
allies in the minority - notably in the Term Limits case.
The Rehnquist Court has become an extremely fragmented
Court. It issued opinions in only eighty-two cases - the lowest
number in almost forty years. Fewer than half of those cases were
decided unanimously, and only one of the 9-to-O decisions 68 was in an
important case. On the other side, sixteen cases - twenty per cent of
the total - were decided by a bare majority. Twelve of those saw the
Chief Justice and his allies on the winning side. The margin in most of
them was provided by the O'Connor-Kennedy votes.69
It should also be stressed that what used to be the center in the
Burger Court is now the left. This is even more apparent if we com-
pare the present Court with the Warren Court. At least after the re-
tirement of Justice Frankfurter, that Court had seven members who
were more to the left than any present Justice and there was no Justice
as conservative as the Court's conservative core today. The center
swing Justices today - O'Connor and Kennedy - would definitely
have been on the extreme right on the Warren Court, and, to a lesser
65. i
66. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: Ti BURGER COURT IN ACTION
29 (1990).
67. Id.
68. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct.
2338 (1995).
69. Greenhouse, supra note 64, § 4.
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extent, that would be true as well of Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer. From this point of view, the Rehnquist Court has
seen a definite shift to the right.
One of the most interesting things about the 1994 Term has been
the coming out of Justice Thomas. He has now become one of the
Court's most forceful voices, writing lengthy opinions on some of the
most important issues of the day. They have been very interesting,
very provocative, and should provide grist for the academic mills for
years to come. Thomas, says one commentator, "seems eager to take
the Court on a journey back to the nation's founding and beyond. '70
Unfortunately, most of his detailed excursions into constitutional his-
tory and intent are irrelevant. For example, in the Lopez case, he
wrote a concurring opinion7' which goes in great detail into the origi-
nal intent behind the Commerce Clause. It shows conclusively that
those who drafted the Commerce Clause never intended it to have
anything like the broad meaning it has had during the past half cen-
tury. That may be pertinent, but scarcely as determinative as Justice
Thomas makes it, in a case interpreting the Constitution in 1995.
When the Framers wrote the Commerce Clause, we were only a small
parochial, largely agricultural society. They could not even have
dimly foreseen the type of post-industrial society we have come to be,
with the new means of production, transportation, and the fantastic
communications revolution that have been developed. Perhaps Jus-
tice Thomas is right on intent at the time the Constitution was drafted.
But that is largely beside the point. The Court is not interpreting the
Constitution in 1789; it is interpreting it to meet the needs of today's
society. If Justice Thomas and those who join with him on the "origi-
nal intent" interpretation of the Constitution were to prevail, we
would have a very different instrument and one which could not be
adapted to the "ever-changing conditions of national... life."72
William H. Rehnquist is, of course, taken as the archetype of the
conservative jurist. If anything, however, he is not a true conservative,
whether you agree or disagree with his judicial approach, but a radical
activist: "judicial activism, a phrase that conservatives once hurled as
an epithet, easily fits Chief Justice Rehnquist's ... opinion[s]. '73 To
Supreme Court aficionados, Rehnquist showed his true radical colors
70. Mauro, supra note 2, at S23.
71. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642-51 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
72. Justice Brennan, quoted in BERNARD SCHwARTZ, MAIN CuRENrs IN AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT 639 (1993).
73. Greenhouse, supra note 64, § 4.
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when, early in 1995, he gave the high bench a new sartorial touch:
four thick golden stripes on the upper part of each sleeve of the Rehn-
quist robe.74 This was the first change in Supreme Court attire since
the Justices adopted the untrimmed, ordinary black robe which they
have worn since about 1800.
"He designed the robe himself," the Court's public information
officer stated, "after having seen a performance of Gilbert and Sulli-
van's 'Iolanthe' last June in which the lord chancellor wore a similar
robe." It was added that the stripes "very likely will be permanent."
They have been worn by the Chief Justice ever since.
Chief Justice Rehnquist was quoted in the press as defending the
new attire by saying that a British Lord Chancellor's robe is decorated
that way. The true Gilbert and Sullivan touch, however, is that the
British Lord Chancellor does not wear anything like the Rehnquist
robe. Rehnquist himself may be a Gilbert and Sullivan aficionado,
who once appeared in a production of Trial by Jury. Yet even those
masters of comic opera would have hesitated to portray a real Chief
Justice who decided to wear a robe which he saw in a Gilbert and
Sullivan operetta.
74. The remainder of this article is derived from BERNAD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: How
THE SUPREME COURT DEcDmES CAsES 20-21 (1996).
1996]
11
Schwartz: Term Limits, Commerce, and the Rehnquist Court
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1995
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 31 [1995], Iss. 3, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol31/iss3/8
